


UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



3 1761 00002153 5

Ewart, John Skirving
The disruption of
Canada

F
5081
E85
ROBA

57

The Disruption of Canada

by

John S. Ewart, K.C.


Ottawa, Ont.

The Disruption
of Canada

**A limited number of
copies of this booklet
may be secured free
of charge by applying
to the Author**

John S. Brown, R.C.
Ottawa, Ont.

F
5081
E85



The Disruption of Canada.

INTRODUCTION.—If, after many years of abstention from politics, I venture, at this most serious period of Canada's history, to offer counsel to my fellow electors, it is because Canada is being disrupted, and because, in discharge of duty to my country, I deem it necessary to say that, in my opinion, Sir Robert Borden is, in very large measure, responsible for that most deplorable situation. Having in 1910-1911, for mere party purposes, abetted the propagation of anti-British sentiments among the people of Quebec, Sir Robert, without the slightest effort to counteract what had been done, suddenly turned upon those same people with a law which his friends had taught them to detest, and which he knew could be carried into operation only through the display of force. By the work of these friends, as countenanced by himself, and by his subsequent abrupt and sharp antagonism to those whom they had educated, he is, I say, disrupting Canada. When that is happening, I feel that I cannot, and that I ought not to keep silence.

It was inevitable, as Canada emerged from her degrading colonialism, that difficulties should be encountered, that differences of opinion should arise; and it was possible that racial and religious antagonisms should render still more arduous the solution of the many problems which would necessarily attend the readjustment of our political status. It was not inevitable that the leader of one of the great political parties should add enormously to the perplexities of the situation. I charge as against Sir Robert Borden that that is what he has done.

THE SITUATION.—To understand the situation, a few preliminary words are necessary. The war-relationship between Canada and the United Kingdom was very clearly stated in a memorandum submitted by the War Office to the Colonial Conference of 1902.

“Prior to the outbreak of the war in South Africa, so far as any general scheme for the defence of the Empire as a whole had been considered, it was assumed that the military responsibilities of our great self-governing colonies were limited to local defence, and that the entire burden of furnishing reinforcements to any portion of the Empire against which a hostile attack in force might be directed must fall on the regular army. There may possibly have been some pious hope that in time of need the colonies might rally to the mother country, but no definite arrangements were made, nor were inquiries even on foot as to whether such aid might be expected, and if so, in what strength. Indeed, the necessity for it was by no means realized, and its reliability was doubted” (a).

At the Conference Mr. Chamberlain endeavored, in various ways, to fasten obligation upon us. He was disappointed. The efforts were not repeated at the Conference of 1907—Mr. Campbell-Bannerman was then in power. But in 1909 (March) came the German scare, and, with it, the commencement of the consideration of our attitude. From that time on, war has always been a probability. In 1911 occurred the Morocco incident (Agadir); followed by the Mansion House challenge of Mr. Lloyd George. In 1912 and 1913, the Turks and the Balkan nations fought for Balkan territory. The treaty of Bucharest was a makeshift; and the constitution of Albania a mere postponement. The day of Canada's decision was rapidly approaching. And everybody knew that among her people was sharp and fundamental division of opinion as to her course of action.

THREE VIEWS.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN'S VIEW.—Three views existed as to what Canada ought to do in the event of war. Sir Robert Borden's opinion may be gathered from his opposition to the clause in Sir Wilfrid Laurier's naval bill reserving to the Canadian Government a discretion as to the inactivity of Canadian ships in time of war. Sir Robert moved in the House (February 3, 1910) as follows:

“The proposals of the Government do not follow the suggestions and recommendations of the Admiralty, and, in so far as they empower the Government to withhold the naval forces of Canada from those of the Empire in time of war, are ill-advised and dangerous” (b).

(a) *Quoted in Kingdom Papers, vol. 1, p. 254.*

(b) *Hansard, p. 2,991.*

Sir Robert evidently held the same view as that expressed by Mr. Fielding (April 19, 1910)—

“I say that whenever the British nation shall become involved in a war with a great power, I do not stop to consider whether it is a just or an unjust war—so long as we are part of the British Empire, I care not what Government is in power in Canada, it will be its duty instantly to join and help the mother-country” (a).

VIEW OF THE NATIONALISTS.—The view of the Quebec Nationalist party was embodied in a resolution adopted at a demonstration in Montreal (November 9, 1910) by a meeting which

“declares itself ready to approve of all necessary and efficient measures to make sure the defence of Canadian territory; but it considers as contrary to the principle of Canadian autonomy and to the real unity of the Empire any policy tending to impose upon Canada, that has no voice in the government of the Empire, any share in the external responsibilities or in the military defence of the Empire, outside of Canadian territory—the only portion of the Empire upon which the Canadian people may exercise any political or constitutional action” (b).

There is no hesitation and no compromise in that resolution. It is a clear, sharp renunciation of any duty to

“share in the external responsibilities or in the military defence of the Empire outside of Canadian territory.”

This Nationalist view may, speaking generally, be said to be the French Canadian view. And for its hold upon Quebec opinion, Sir Robert and his friends are very largely responsible.

SIR WILFRID'S VIEW.—Between those two fundamentally opposite views, Sir Wilfrid occupied intermediate ground. He took the usual, and the only safe course. He declared his principle and left its application to circumstances as they might arise. On various occasions he used language such as the following:

“I hope the day will never come when we will be drawn into the conflicts of Europe. But I have no hesitation in saying that the supremacy of the British Empire is absolutely essential, not only to the maintenance of that Empire but to the civilization of the world. I have no hesitation in saying that the supremacy of the British Empire on the seas must be maintained in the highest degree of efficiency it has

(a) *Hansard*, p. 7,469.

(b) *Kingdom Papers*, vol. 1, p. 283.

occupied the last hundred years. I have no hesitation in saying also that if the day should come when the supremacy of Britain on the high seas will be challenged, it will be the duty of all the daughters of the nation to close round the old motherland and make a rampart about her to ward off an attack" (a).

"If England is at war we are at war and liable to attack. I do not say that we shall always be attacked, neither do I say that we would take part in all the wars of England. That is a matter that must be determined by circumstances, upon which the Canadian Parliament will have to pronounce, and will have to decide in its own best judgment" (b).

WHICH DO YOU LIKE?—With which of these three views do you agree?

I do not argue with you. Every man must answer for himself, but, in doing so, he must think not of the present war (about which the leaders agree), but of future wars.

(1) We pledge ourselves, in advance, that we will participate, offensively, in **every** war in which the United Kingdom may be engaged, whatever the cause, and whether it be just or unjust;

(2) We declare that we will participate in NO wars, except in defence of Canadian territory; or

(3) Our principle is that stated by Sir Wilfrid, and our action will be

"determined by circumstances, upon which the Canadian parliament will have to pronounce, and will have to decide in its own best judgment."

THE NATIONALISTS.

The first element in the charge against Sir Robert is his association with the Nationalists. Who were they? and to what extent was Sir Robert associated with them?

MR. MONK.—Mr. Monk was a life-long Conservative. Although in 1910, he was not nominally the Conservative leader in Quebec, his position and conspicuous ability often gained for him

(a) *Hansard*, 1909, pp. 3,511, 2.

(b) *Hansard*, 1909-10, pp. 2,964, 5.

that title. The Canadian Annual Review so spoke of him in 1910 (a); and in 1911 it referred to him

“as being for several years the recognized Conservative leader in Quebec —with a certain brief exception” (b).

Mr. Monk did not agree with Sir Robert Borden's proposal to send, without a reference to the electors, a cash contribution to the British navy; but in his opposition to Sir Wilfrid, and in every other respect, he co-operated cordially with his leader. He joined Sir Robert's government in 1911.

MONK AND BOURASSA. In 1910, Mr. Monk, the better to prosecute opposition to Sir Wilfrid's navy bill, formed a special group styled “Autonomists,” and having been urged by his Conservative supporters to initiate a campaign against the Liberal government, and feeling himself to be unequal, physically, for the task, he appealed to Mr. Bourassa to assume the bulk of the work (c). An arrangement was made. Meetings, commencing with St. Eustache (July 17, 1910), were held over the Province of Quebec: St. Henri, St. Hyacinthe, Vaudreuil, Longue-Pointe, St. Remi, Farnham, Grand Mère, etc., etc. Messrs. Nantel, Sevigny, Blondin, Coderre, and Patenaude, who subsequently became members of the Borden government, were members of the party. At all these meetings, identical resolutions were adopted, condemning both the Laurier policy of a Canadian navy, and the Borden policy of monetary contributions (without an electoral appeal) to the British navy; but approving of Mr. Monk's insistence upon submission to the people of any proposal which would change the relations between Canada and the United Kingdom.

DRUMMOND-ARTHABASKA.—The Autonomists, working with, but largely overshadowed by, the Nationalists (d) exhibited most astonishing success at the by-election of Drummond-Arthabaska (November 3, 1910). The constituency had been Liberal since 1887 and we may well assume that in turning a previous Laurier majority of 834 into a minority of 207 (e), every Conservative in the riding

(a) P. 182.

(b) Pp. 181, 182.

(c) Bourassa: *Que devons-nous à l'Angleterre?* pp., 220-1. “*Le Devoir, son origine, son passé, et son avenir*,” p. 9.

(d) See *Canadian Annual Review*, 1910, p. 192.

(e) *Ibid*, pp. 192, 198.

voted for the Nationalist candidate. L'Evenement, the Conservative organ in Quebec, gave its support (a). The Canadian Annual Review, 1910, records as follows:

"What was the Conservative attitude in this campaign? It was in the main one of official inaction, but of local Nationalistic support" (b)

Sir George Foster was asked:

"How do you advise Conservatives to vote in the Arthabaska election?"

He replied:

"My advice to every Conservative is to vote as his intelligence and conscience dictate. The Laurier Administration is so extravagant, corrupt and lacking in principle that I would vote to turn it out, and so give opportunity to replace it by a better one" (c).

Mr. S. Barker, a prominent Hamilton Conservative, answered the same query by expressing the hope that

"every Conservative will do his duty for Canada, for his party, and against the Liberal Government" (d).

They voted for the Nationalist candidate.

"In the official publication giving the returns of this election the vote was recorded as Conservative 3,451 and Liberal 3,244. The Nationalists were not mentioned" (e).

Six days after the election, the Nationalists, at a mass demonstration in Montreal defined their attitude in the resolution above quoted.

SIR ROBERT'S DECLARATIONS.—The Nationalists had supplied Sir Robert with a supporter. Pleased, grateful, and desirous of further favor, he made a speech in the House of Commons, fifteen days after the Montreal demonstration, in which were such carefully worded declarations that Mr. Pelletier (a leading Nationalist) afterwards said that they

(a) *Ibid.*, p. 194.

(b) *Ibid.*, p. 198.

(c) *Ibid.*

(d) *Ibid.*

(e) *Ibid.* p. 199.

“were perfectly satisfactory in the Province of Quebec. Those are the facts which we stated in Quebec” (a).

ELECTIONS OF 1911.—For the general election campaign of the following year (1911), Mr. Monk and his Conservative associates formed a separate organization but all three groups—Conservatives, on the one hand, and Autonomists and Nationalists, on the other, worked together, divided the constituencies between them, and voted for one another’s candidates. The Conservatives retained the English-speaking counties of the Eastern Townships, Pontiac, Argen-teuil, and the three Montreal divisions of St. Antoine, Ste. Anne, and St. Laurent, and left the others to Mr. Monk as representing both Autonomists and Nationalists. Mr. Bourassa tells us that—

“It was distinctly agreed that with these exceptions Mr. Monk had exclusive charge of the whole Province, with the right to accept or refuse prospective candidates” (b).

The Canadian Annual Review testifies that Mr. Monk employed his time, during the election, in

“stumping Quebec with Mr. Bourassa and his allies against the Laurier Government” (c).

MR. BOURASSA IN ONTARIO.—Instead of endeavoring to limit Mr. Bourassa’s opportunities for dissemination of his opinions, Sir Robert, through his party agents, invited him into Ontario. In proof, I quote from the Canadian Annual Review:

“At Sudbury, on the 18th, Mr. Bourassa received an Ontario Con-servative welcome and made a remarkable address. The chair was occupied by the President of the local Conservative Association and the guest commenced with a vigorous denunciation of the Lanctot scandal and of Mr. Oliver, the Minister of the Interior” (d).

Mr. Bourassa is then quoted as follows:

“I say that no Government, whether Tory or Liberal, whether headed by an Englishman or a Frenchman, has the right to come to us and plunge us into a war beyond Canada’s border altogether, until Canadian people in Canada have the same voice in the declaration of such wars as have the people of Great Britain” (e).

(a) *Hansard, 18th March, 1912, p. 5,413.*

(b) *Le Devoir, 30th May, 1913.*

(c) *P. 179.*

(d) *P. 190.*

(e) *Pp. 190, 191.*

LE DEVOIR.—But that is not all. Mr. Bourassa had commenced (January, 1910) the publication of a newspaper—*Le Devoir*. Its assistance, as well as that of its editor, was needed. Conservative managers were interested in securing for it a largely increased circulation. What did they do? In the issue of June 2, 1913, you may read the following:

“There came to our office one of the most prominent members of the Conservative party, carrying under his arm the Voters’ List of all Eastern Ridings. He paid into our hands subscriptions to “*Le Devoir*” for thousands and thousands of electors. We asked nothing but the regular subscription price, deducting therefrom the ordinary commission paid to agents. We thus enjoyed the satisfaction of using Tory money to circulate the good Nationalist doctrine everywhere.”

NATIONALIST LANGUAGE.—Let me give you some specimens of the language with which the Nationalists were helping Sir Robert to “beat Laurier.” I take them from the *Canadian Annual Review* (1911), whose compiler, Mr. J. Castell Hopkins, is a good Conservative and Imperialist.

“If war were declared Canada would be compelled to take part in it, but it would not be the blood of Sir Wilfrid Laurier or that of his children which would pay the penalty of this resolution. It would be your blood and that of your children” (a).

“A premium is offered to the postmasters throughout the country—what for? For the heads of wolves? Oh, no! the premium is one of two dollars for every man enrolled in the Canadian navy to be massacred in the service of England! (b).

“English and African soldiers fell on the veldt for the glory of Chamberlain; women died of shame and misery for the grandeur of Laurier; children’s entrails were cut out in the Concentration camps for the honour of the Empire” (c).

“The Empire has grown so great that England is not able herself to provide sufficient men to protect it. Therefore the Colonies are called upon to supply the men. . . . These men are liable to be sent abroad to be massacred for the glory of Laurier and Lemieux” (d).

The language of Mr. Sevigny, the present Minister of Inland Revenue ought not to be omitted. He said:

(a) *P. 183.*

(b) *P. 184.*

(c) *P. 184.*

(d) *P. 185.*

“The Laurier Cabinet is a cabinet of Imperialists who want to sacrifice Canada’s interests and plunge us into wars with which we have nothing to do. The Navy Bill is an attempt by Ontario and the Provinces of the West to coerce Quebec and enslave our people forever. What has England ever done for you? She has no need of your help. She is strong enough to defend herself. Laurier’s ideal is to make you the vassals of the majority in the West. You must protest by your votes against this slave traffic. You must protest against helping England in her wars; unless you do conscription will come next.”

“The Navy belongs to His Majesty. Is that a Canadian Navy? Who is His Majesty? Have we any Majesty here?” (a)

LIBERAL LANGUAGE.—Combating all this, the Liberals Mr. Lemieux, Mr. Marcil, Mr. Gladu, and others argued in the following vein:

“Who will be so hard-hearted among the French-Canadians as not to defend the flag if Great Britain is ever threatened? You will not see the record under the sun of a people, so weak after their defeat by the English, being treated with such generosity as has been extended to the French-Canadians” (b).

“We want to aid the Mother Country if she needs it, and I may say right here that it is my frank and honest opinion that if there is a part of the Dominion that should help to maintain the unity and strength of the British Empire it is the French-Canadian people” (c).

“I am of French origin and a Catholic but you will not prevent me from believing, and from saying, that gratitude and justice should prompt us to do our duty by England. Let me recall the words of Mgr. Plessis who said: ‘It is to our allegiance to England that we owe the French-Canadian race’ ” (d).

SIR ROBERT’S LANGUAGE.—Recognizing the effectiveness of the appeals of the Nationalists against enrolling men

“in the Canadian navy to be massacred in the service of England,”

Sir Robert supplemented it by publishing in the Quebec press (e) the following:

“Je soutiens que le Gouvernement a la prétention de créer une force navale qui ne nous sera aucunement utile en temps de guerre, et, qui, par conséquent, ne rapportera aucun profit ni au Canada ni

(a) *Can. Annual Review*, 1910, pp. 196, 7.

(b) *Can. Annual Review*, 1911, p. 192.

(c) *Ib.*, p. 192.

(d) *Ib.*, p. 193.

(e) *As in Mr. Pelletier’s paper, l’Événement de Québec, 16th August, 1911.*

à l'Empire. Cette coûtera pour la nearim construire, l'équiper, et la maintenir des sommes énormes. En temps de guerre elle demandera probablement le sacrifice inutile de milliers de vies utiles et elle n'ajoutera pas un iota à la force armée de l'Empire " (a).

"I hold that the plan of the Government contemplates the creation of a naval force that will be absolutely useless in time of war, and, therefore, of no practical benefit to Canada or to the Empire. It will cost immense sums of money to build, equip and maintain. It will probably result in time of war in the useless sacrifice of many valuable lives, and it will not add one iota to the fighting strength of the Empire."

Sir Robert was not in his most honest mood when he penned these lines.

SIR ROBERT'S GRATITUDE.—Of the astonishingly large numbers of Quebec supporters which Sir Robert obtained at the 1911 elections, only six were not known as Nationalists, and those six received Nationalist support. After the elections identity was lost, for **Sir Robert took three of the Nationalists into his Cabinet:** and in the Canadian Annual Review they were all classed with Sir Robert as "Conservatives." Mr. Monk was rewarded with the Department of Public Works, and almost immediately afterwards, from his place in the House of Commons (November 23, 1911) he said:

"I was born and bred a Conservative, and I never varied in my allegiance to the party. I intend to die in the faith" (a).

Mr. Pelletier became Postmaster-General. He had taken no part in the campaign of 1910, but (as Mr. Bourassa tells us) he stood at the election of 1911 as a "disciple of Armand Lavergne"(b). Mr. Nantel was appointed Minister of Inland Revenue, and afterwards was given a most comfortable seat on the Railway Commission. He was one of the Monk-Bourassa party in the campaign of 1910. Mr. Coderre, Mr. Blondin, and Mr. Sevigny, who subsequently became members of the Borden government, were also of that party. Mr. Armand Lavergne has said that both he and Mr. Bourassa were offered seats in Sir Robert's cabinet(c). Mr. Sevigny, who had asked, "Who is His Majesty? Have we any Majesty here?" was requested by Sir Robert to second the motion for reply to the Governor's speech at the opening of the session. In reply to attack

(a) *Hansard*, p. 237.

(b) *Bourassa: Que devons-nous à l'Angleterre?* p. 239.

(c) *Speech at St. Stanislaus*, 7 Nov., 1915.

upon Sir Robert for associating himself with a Nationalist in the person of Mr. Monk, Mr. Fripp probably expressed the feeling of the Conservative party when he said:

“Well, I venture to think that the people of this country from the Atlantic to the Pacific do not care one iota whether the Minister of Public Works is a Nationalist or whether he is not ”(a).

Upon what terms did those three Nationalists enter the Borden government? Possibly we ought charitably to assume that recantation of their extravagantly anti-British principles was required of them. But Mr. Pelletier’s account of the transaction—undenied, as far as I know—is as follows:

“I was invited to enter the Cabinet and was not asked to abandon a single article of my programme” b).

SIR ROBERT’S RESPONSIBILITY.—In view of the foregoing facts it is perfectly useless for Sir Robert to deny association with the Nationalists or responsibility for the present attitude of Quebec towards conscription. All that Sir Wilfrid had proposed was the construction of a Canadian navy, with Canadian control of it in time of war. To that the Nationalists objected on the ground that it **might** mean that their men would be sent to fight. Sir Robert’s party joined with the Nationalists in their endeavor to “beat Laurier.” They divided the constituencies between them. They invited Mr. Bourassa to speak for them in Ontario. They paid for the distribution of **Le Devoir** to “thousands and thousands of electors.” Sir Robert gave to leading Nationalists places in his government. And if Quebec electors are now opposed to much more drastic legislation—to **their actually being sent to fight**—may I not remind Sir Robert of one of the sentences in his speech of June 11 last—

“It is easy to sow the wind of clamour against the imposition of equal duty and obligation upon all Canadians for the preservation of their country; but those who make that sowing may reap such a whirlwind as they do not dream of to-day” (c),

—or rather, as they are experiencing to-day. Mr. Ballantyne a few days ago, said

(a) *Hansard*, 23 Nov., 1911.

(b) *Speech at banquet at Quebec, 9 Dec., 1911: Canadian Annual Review, 1911* p. 300.

(c) *Hansard*, pp. 2289.

"The aloofness of French-Canadians from enlistment was due to the fact that they took their ideas from their political leaders. It was due to the new 'unholy alliance,' Bourassa, Laurier, Lavergne, Lemieux and Company" (a).

He was very nearly right, but he slipped a little on the word "**new**". For, by using it, he admits (what is often denied) that there was an "**unholy alliance**" in 1910-11, which (may I remind Mr. Ballantyne) Mr. Lemieux opposed to the best of his ability.

PRESENT REPUDIATION.—The validity of Sir Robert's contention that he was under no obligation to repudiate the association of his party with the Nationalists in 1910-11, depends entirely upon whether duty to party ought to precede duty to country. When some very ill-informed person, last August, alleged the existence of connection between Conservatives and Nationalists for the purposes of the present campaign, Sir Robert instantly sprang to his feet in the House and said (August 16):

"There is not, and never will be, any connection or collusion between my friends and supporters and those of the Nationalist party of Quebec." (b)

When the Nationalists are working against Sir Robert, as they now are, he indignantly, although very unnecessarily, repudiates them. When they were working with his party, but (as he thought) against his country, he allowed Sir George Foster, Mr. Barker, and others to encourage them, while he remained silent. And observe that Sir Robert confines the repudiation which he now makes to the present and to the future. Being of a truthful disposition, he could not apply it to the past. That has gone into irrevocable history, and the association of Sir Robert's party with the Nationalists in 1910-11 is indelibly recorded there.

MORE TROOPS OR MORE FOOD.

FOOD WANTED.—Before attempting an examination of the real reason for the introduction of conscription in Canada, we must carefully consider what Canada ought to have done in order that she might contribute in the most effective way towards "winning the war." If the necessity for maintaining, in undiminished numbers, the troops which Canada has sent to the front be admitted, then

(a) *The Citizen (Ottawa), 23rd November, 1917.*

(b) *Hans. p. 4744.*

conscription was inevitable, and the only question would have been as to the method of its introduction—in sudden reversal of previous education, or preceded by deprecatory appeals to a previously misguided public. But, except spectacularly and sentimentally, there was no such necessity. What was wanted, and was begged, from Canada was not men but food.

“DESERTION.”—Sir Robert has not scrupled to speak of the permitted diminution of our forces as “desertion” of those who survive—as leaving them to “their fate”; and from many quarters comes the equally foolish statement that diminution means the imposition of correspondingly greater toil. If a full battalion be given certain work, and if after depletion by say fifty per cent, it be required to do an equal amount, then these assertions are well founded. But if duty be assigned (as, of course, it is) upon the basis not of the original, but of the actual strength of the battalion, then they are plainly fallacious. You will not desert your troops if you do your best to support them. And the real question is, in what way can we render the greatest possible assistance?

APPEALS FOR FOOD.—Sir Robert would have resented (he tells us) any British suggestion of conscription in Canada. None was offered. He made no objection to the appeals which actually were made—to the appeals of Lord Rhondda (the British food-controller) that we should furnish vastly increased food supplies, or to the very palpable hints that we should send our men to the farms rather than to the trenches. Lord Rhondda has recently said (underlining added):

“We look to the resources of Canada, and to the indomitable energy of Canadians, for an answer that will shatter Germany’s threat of starvation. In normal times the Mother Country is dependent on your Dominion for a large part of its food supplies. War has increased that dependence to such an extent that it is now vital for the United Kingdom and the Allies in Europe to obtain from Canada foodstuffs in far larger quantities than under peace conditions. That must necessarily entail effort and far-reaching economy, with their attendant sacrifices on the part of Canadians.”

I know that, like ourselves at home, the pick of your manhood have gone, and are going to take their splendid share in the front line of battle, and that, therefore, you are faced with the difficulty of a supply of labor. I also realize that an increased export of food supplies must entail diversion of effort from other enterprise, yet I am convinced that the people of Canada will surmount all obstacles, and that the

harvest, as far as human labor can achieve, will be a striking demonstration of Canada's efficiency and determination. The willingness of the Canadian people to permit control of their products for purposes of winning the war is naturally welcomed by all the Allies as tending to increase the supply and to regulate prices. The certainty that we can rely on your whole-hearted co-operation, not only in utilizing every ounce of national energy to increase production, but in equitable adjustment of prices, gives me the greatest encouragement. I most heartily wish you every success in your all-important work" (a).

* **THE RESPONSE.**—Our duty—our plain, manifest, imperious duty—was to make quick, active, and effective response to these appeals. I charge against Sir Robert that he has done almost nothing. Last year, indeed, Mr. Burrell issued some excellent pamphlets, and he and others preached "production, more production, and still more production." But all that has been accomplished is that some vacant lots have been turned into vegetable gardens. Lord Rhondda asked for devotion to food-raising and "the diversion of effort from other enterprise." Sir Robert replied with conscription, for the purpose of continuing our effort in "other enterprise." Lord Rhondda appealed for aid against Germany's "threats of starvation." Sir Robert replied with pamphlets and preachings. Lord Rhondda urged "utilizing every ounce of national energy to increase production." Sir Robert replied by disrupting Canada in order to send the very best of our energy to Europe. That is not playing the game. That, if you wish, is "desertion"—desertion of our plain duty, and a childish preference for the spectacular to that which, if less showy, is of infinitely greater importance.

IMPORTANCE OF FOOD-SUPPLY.—The question of food-supply for the Allies is, to my mind, very much more serious than the defection of Russia, and Lord Rhondda does well to interject the word "starvation." If you do not agree with me, it is because you do not read current and easily available literature. More than a year ago, I tried to rouse public opinion to a realisation of the terrifying importance of the food situation; and, for my reward, received some newspaper abuse. Do you know what are the conditions in France, Italy, Belgium, Serbia, and Rumania today? You do not know them fully, and neither do I. But we know enough to justify the recent statement of Dr. J. W. Robertson (capitals added)

(a) *Military Gazette (Can.), 14th August, 1917.*

"Taking all these factors into consideration, it is no exaggeration to say that the world faces a food situation that is **NOTHING SHORT OF APPALLING**. . . We should use all the experience we have thus far gained in planning and carrying forward a campaign for **LARGER ACREAGES** and higher yields in 1918 and the years that are to **follow**" (a)

That is precisely the contrary of what we are doing.

SENATE OPINION.—A committee of the Senate, under the capable chairmanship of Mr. Nicholls, during last session considered the situation and reported (capitals added)

"1. That the Government should without delay, endeavour to **ENCOURAGE THE BREAKING OF A LARGE ACREAGE OF WILD LANDS** in order that such new soil may be ready for cultivation next year and our productive capacity thereby increased.

2. That if it is found necessary, in order to encourage farmers to bring additional acreage under cultivation, that a bounty of a certain sum be paid for each and every acre of wild land put under cultivation and off which a crop is raised during the next ensuing two years."

Observing that bounties and high prices would not of themselves produce wheat—that Governmental action was necessary—the committee added:

"The shortage of farm labour must be met, and the method of meeting it must be **PROMPT AND DECISIVE**, if our present production of wheat and other cereals is to be **MAINTAINED, LET ALONE INCREASED.**"(b)

The committee proposed the introduction of Asiatic labor—a possible solution, and one which, rather than that our allies should severely suffer, I should be prepared to accept. But Sir Robert did not like it. And he knew that British Columbia would not like it. So, with some excellent Senate speeches, the work of the committee passed into oblivion. "The shortage of farm labour must be met;" action "must be prompt and decisive," said the Senate committee. And Sir Robert sends the only available supply to France!

OTHER OPINION.—So much for the Senate. Now let me give some facts from other sources—

(a) *Urban and Rural Development, published by the Commission of Conservation, Canada, p. 62.*

(b) *Hansard, 15th August, 1917, pp. 683-7.*

Lord Northcliffe, speaking recently at Toronto, said that it is known to economists that the world's supply of food is not sufficient to feed the world's armies and the civilian population, too" (a).

At Ottawa, Lord Northcliffe said that the shortage of food was—"owing to the shortage of labor caused by the war. . . labor has been taken away from the farm, which has produced varying harvests with the result that there is a world shortage of food" (b).

Mr. Hanna, our Food Controller (who, as far as I can see, is doing good work along the line of food conservation), tells us in his Bulletins that

"Recent developments in Europe, official correspondence and the latest crop estimates make it plain that the world food situation to-day is serious beyond anything that we could see a few months ago . . . The requirements of Great Britain will be much larger than they were last year. We must also ensure the women and children of France against terrible suffering and make certain that the Allied cause will not be weakened by shortage of essential food supplies.

The situation is grave to-day and time has come when the people of Canada must realize that the Allies are depending on the continent of North America to a far greater extent than ever before. It is within the power of all of us effectively to support the efforts of our armies" (c).

"Britain is on war rations.

"Britain eats war-bread.

"The weekly bread allowance per person in England is four pounds.

"Sale of fresh bread is prohibited. It must be at least 12 hours old" (d).

"The call to Canada is to produce—produce as well as save. Canada has the arable land, millions and millions of acres of it.

"We are 3,000 miles away from the actual conflict. Canada and the United States are belligerent countries who enjoy immunity from the devastation of war. Nothing should interrupt the producers who stay at home in this work of supporting the men who have gone to the front, and their families, and the national life these men are fighting to preserve.

**"LABOUR MUST BE SUPPLIED TO THE FARMS BY THE CITIES
IN TIME OF WAR WHEN LABOUR IS SCARCE.**

(a) *Can. Food Bulletin, No. 2 (19th October, 1917), p. 4.*

(b) *Ibid, p. 10.*

(c) *Can. Food Bulletin, No. 3 (3rd Nov., 1917), p. 1.*

(d) *"Food Service," (1st Sept., 1917), p. 10. Issued by Mr. Hanna.*

"CANADA IS THE BASE OF SUPPLIES. CANADA MUST NOT FAIL. CANADA MUST PRODUCE" (a).

Mr. Hanna says that the Allies will be short this year by the staggering total of 370,000,000 bushels.

"The bulk of this requirement will have to come from North America. If this continent fails to supply it, thousands will starve while the supplies for the armies will be dangerously jeopardized" (b).

"It was well that the people of Canada should know that the food situation was very serious and that unless supplies were provided from this side of the Atlantic there would be great suffering among the Allied peoples in Europe" (c).

At a recent official conference, Mr. Crerar, the Minister of Agriculture, said:

"that there were difficulties in the situation. One of these was the shortness of help which was a very serious question" (d).

That is all most indisputably true. It was not mere panic that induced Mr. Sidney Webb to entitle his recent article (*Contemporary Review*, October) **"THE WORLD FAMINE INTO WHICH WE ARE HURRYING."**

EFFECT ON THE FRONT.—And what is the effect of these conditions upon the possibility of the future maintenance of "our boys in the trenches?" Lord Rhondda puts it in this way:

"The danger of the food situation lies not so much in the submarine peril as in the world shortage of cereals, meats and fats . . . The tightening of the blockade is a two-edged sword. Imports of bacon and other products into the United Kingdom from Denmark are thereby bound to be seriously reduced. This throws us more than ever upon the North American continent for our supplies. WHAT WE ASK FROM THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA WE CANNOT PROCURE ELSEWHERE. UNLESS THE ALLIES IN EUROPE ARE ABLE TO IMPORT THE SUPPLIES NECESSARY FOR FEEDING THEIR ARMIES AND THEIR CIVIL POPULATIONS, VICTORY MAY SLIP FROM OUR UNITED GRASP" (e).

(a) *Ibid*, p. 12.

(b) *Ibid*, p. 5.

(c) *Can. Food Bulletin*, No. 4, p. 6.

(d) *Ibid*, p. 7.

(e) *Bulletin*, No. 2, p. 11.

Lord Northcliffe asks you this question:

"Can you imagine the boys in the trenches surviving a week if we had to cut down their pork and beans and the various things they have to eat" (a).

Mr. Lloyd George has well said that:

"The line which the British Empire holds against the Germans is held by those who work on the land as well as those who fight on land and sea" (b).

Mr. Hanna is not less peremptory. He says:

"Is famine to be the arbiter of the war? Our kinsmen in Great Britain and Ireland, our Allies in France, Italy and Belgium are not on the farms. Women, children and old men have taken their places doing what they can to fight famine. Our kinsmen and our ALLIES ARE FIGHTING FOR US. WE CAN AT LEAST FIGHT FAMINE FOR THEM" (c).

"The fighting efficiency of the Allied forces will be impaired unless Canada awakens to the seriousness of the food problem. There rests upon us a tremendous responsibility —perhaps for the very issue of the war" (d).

"Germany is trying to starve our Mother Country and your boys at the front.

What are you going to do about it"? (e)

"Britain looks to Canada to shatter Germany's threat of starvation" (f).

Senator Watson, a practical farmer from Manitoba, in a speech in the House last session (August 15) said:

"At the present time the farmer is working to the limit, and is paying as high as \$50 a month for a man for the whole season. Even with that labour employed, he is not able to keep under cultivation the land he has broken at the present time. So, until there is more labour available, there is no use in breaking the land."

"Within the last week I have seen thousands of acres that were once cultivated and which are now covered with noxious weeds, the seeds of which are being blown all over the surrounding country, and the land is in worse condition than if it had never been cultivated" (g).

(a) *Ibid.*

(b) "Food Service," p. 12.

(c) *Bulletin*, No. 2, p. 11.

(d) *Bulletin*, No. 3, p. 1.

(e) "Food Service", p. 9.

(f) *Ibid.*, p. 12.

(g) *Hansard*, pp. 694, 693.

WHAT TO DO.—"What are you going to do about it," Sir Robert? Nothing? That would be bad enough. What you are doing is to make impossible the hearty response which Canada ought to give to appeals for food, not only for our allies but for our own soldiers. "We can at least fight famine for them." Yes, we can; but we cannot do it with pamphlets and preaching—alone.

The Provincial governments, Sir Robert, are doing something. Ontario has provided tractors, and several of the Provinces have encouraged school-boys, civil servants, and others to help at seeding and harvest. That is good, but it is most lamentably insufficient. And while the Provinces are working in one direction, Sir Robert, you are working in the other. Is it not possible for you to shade your eyes from imperialistic glare, and get a straight, steady look at the reality of things? Mr. Hanna puts upon the title page of his "Hand Book for Speakers" the injunction,

"Help to shatter Germany's threat of starvation."

And inside is, "What are you going to do about it?" What, Sir Robert, is your answer?

What have you done? Last session Sir Edward Kemp told us that, up to June 30 last, 45,797 farmers had enlisted, of whom 24,592 came from the western Provinces(a). You claim credit for that, and you denounce Sir Wilfrid for not helping you to do it, while, at the same moment, your new Minister of Agriculture is laboring to UNDO it(b). You will say that those men volunteered. Of course they did, and so did thousands of others whom you refused to accept. Why did you deplete the farms? And why now do you make impossible the substitution of new workers? There may be little glitter and glamour, Sir Robert, about conscription for food-production, but it will enable us to "fight the famine" which threatens our allies. Is it not worth doing?

UNITED STATES TROOPS.—There is another very important consideration that must be taken into account before the question of more troops or more food can be settled. The United States entered the war on April 6 last—more than two months before Sir Robert's conscription speech; and with that accession of almost unlimited soldier-supply, any possible doubt as to the advisability

(a) *Hans. p. 4968.*

(b) *Ottawa Evening Journal, 8th Nov., 1917.*

of devoting Canada's man-power to food-production disappeared. For, first, the United States will raise five or six million men before she equals relatively, Canada's quota. And, second, the question has, by the very fact of the arrival of this new factor, become one, not of how to get men for the front, but of how to send them there. At the moment of writing, British and United States delegates are in consultation (as the *Montreal Gazette*, November 9, put it) as to

"How many troops America can put in the field, without endangering the food and material supplies of France and Italy."

The question is not, **"How many troops can the United States raise?"** but, **"How many can be used?"**

Ship-shortage and lack of food are our greatest dangers. As long ago as August last, the British Colonial Secretary said that

"the West Indies had actually provided more men than it had been possible to convey to the seat of war" (a).

And if that was true in August of the few thousand men which the Islands could offer, what must be the present difficulty with reference to the American millions?

Can anybody suggest any reason (other than a sentimental one) why Canada should compete with the United States for places in the transport ships rather than employ her men in food-production?

WHY WAS CONSCRIPTION INTRODUCED?

THE CONSIDERATIONS.—Under the circumstances as above indicated, it would have appeared to be incredible that Sir Robert should introduce conscription for service in Europe, and to all of us it came as a most startling surprise. For not only had his political friends educated our second largest Province into rampant hostility to the much milder proposal of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, but our plainest duty was to render to our allies the most effective assistance, within the limits of our power, in the way urged upon us by British authorities. And to these considerations, we must now add that as long as Sir Robert remained in touch with Canadian conditions—as long as he remained on this side of the Atlantic—he himself had not deemed conscription to be a part of our duty. Let us see what he said.

FAILURE OF RECRUITING.—In the second of his recently issued manifestoes, Sir Robert tells us that

"when it became apparent that the voluntary system was not providing adequate reinforcements for the army, it became necessary to consider"

(a) *The Times (Eng.)*, 10th August, 1917.

the existing statute and to prepare a new one. When was that? In his recent speech at Halifax, he said:

“Through the summer and autumn of 1916 and the first four months of 1917 recruits came in so slowly, notwithstanding the utmost personal effort of myself and my colleagues, that only one of two alternatives could be adopted”

—and that one was conscription. And he further said that for eighteen months before he introduced his bill (May 18 last)—

“In all parts of this Dominion men of both political parties, men of the loftiest patriotism, and sanest judgment, from time to time had impressed on me warmly the obligation of Canada to throw into this war still greater effort, and the necessity of compulsory military service” (a).

General Mewburn recently said that

“since the Spring of 1916, voluntary enlistments ceased to exist” (b)

SIR ROBERT'S ATTITUDE.—That being the situation, what was Sir Robert's attitude towards it? Let us go back to the beginning of the session of 1916, and read from his speech in the House—

“My Right Honorable friend has alluded to conscription—to the idea in this country, or elsewhere, that there may be conscription in Canada. In speaking in the first two or three months of this war I made it clear to the people of Canada that we did not propose conscription. I REPEAT THAT ANNOUNCEMENT TO-DAY WITH EMPHASIS.”

About the same time, the Minister of the Interior, in the immigration literature which he distributed in the United States, (the “elsewhere”) displayed the following:

“**MILITARY SERVICE IN CANADA IS VOLUNTARY.**—No man is compelled to join the army or serve in the trenches. Canada's military forces are composed entirely of volunteers; all men are free to serve, or not to serve, as they themselves decide. **THERE IS NO CONSCRIPTION IN CANADA**” (c).

From that time until the introduction of the conscription bill, no contrary policy was ever indicated. Indeed the only utterance (as far as I am aware) was Sir Robert's reply to a labor deputation 27 December last) in which he said:

(a) *Evening Journal (Ottawa), 15th November, 1917.*

(b) *Canadian Military Gazette, 13th Nov., 1917.*

(c) *Quoted from Canada West (1916) by Le Devoir, 3rd Nov., 1917.*

“You have asked for an assurance that under no circumstances will conscription be undertaken or carried out. As I stated to you at our interview, I must decline to give any such assurance. I hope that conscription may not be necessary, but if it should prove the only effective method to preserve the existence of the State and of the institutions and liberties which we enjoy, I should consider it necessary and I should not hesitate to act accordingly” (a).

So we may take it that, notwithstanding the failure in recruiting, Sir Robert did not as yet see any propriety in conscription, and the question is: Did he ever become convinced that conscription in Canada was

“the only effective method to preserve the existence of the State?”

He did not. The British authorities told him—what indeed he himself, and all of us who follow events well knew—that the most effective method was “production, more production, and still more production.”

SIR ROBERT’S REASONS.—Early in February, Sir Robert left for England. Until then, we may assume that his opinion as to conscription remained unaltered, for not another syllable on the subject escaped his lips. He returned on the 14th May, and four days afterwards he introduced the conscription bill. What was the reason for the change? If we look at his introducing speech (June 11), we find him saying:

“ . . . I am in a position to assure the House and the country that the need of reinforcements is urgent, insistent and imperative. The effort of Russia is paralyzed for the present—no one knows for how long. The effort of the United States is only beginning” (b).

He said that

“reinforcements must be obtained or the divisions must dwindle.”

He said that unless reinforced, the troops at the front would deem themselves “deserted and betrayed.” But with the exception of Russia’s partial paralysis and the accession of the United States with its almost inexhaustible supply of men, as quickly available as ours, the conditions were similar to those which existed two months before when Sir Robert thought and hoped that conscription was not and would not be appropriate.

Sir Robert’s supporters suggested that he was possessed of very special, and startlingly serious, information which he was not at liberty to divulge. For the moment, the suggestion had some effect. We

(a) *Quoted in Hansard, 1917, p. 2278.*

(b) *Hansard, p. 2278.*

now know that it was founded upon nothing, but a desire to supply supporting argument. There is nothing that Sir Robert knew then that we do not know now—indeed that we did not know then.

Another reason for Sir Robert's sudden change of opinion was suggested; namely, a request from the British government. But in his speech he repudiated that suggestion as the produce of

"a diseased imagination. . . The subject was never discussed between myself and any member of the British Government; if there had been any such suggestion from them, I for one, would not have tolerated it" (a).

Another suggestion (we must, if we can, find some reason) is that fearing defeat at the unavoidable elections, Sir Robert, lending himself to the sinister counselling of Mr. Robert Rogers, callously and criminally adopted conscription as a bit of excellent party strategy. No one who has the honor of Sir Robert's acquaintance believes that story. Why then the change?

SIR ROBERT.—Let us examine Sir Robert a little. He is a fine type of man—a student, a capable administrator, an effective speaker, an excellent debater, as honest as a politician can very well be, but impressionable—very impressionable. Like the rest of us, he has a point of view; he has a political ideal; everything is seen from his own standpoint; very many things have a right or wrong color, according as they harmonize with, or disfigure, his mental concepts; and while he would rightly repudiate the attribution to him of the principle that the end justifies the means, he might regard occurrences which led one way much more complacently than if they tended in a contrary direction. If, in 1910-1911, for example, he had been suffering from, instead of profiting by, the anti-British propaganda of the Quebec Nationalists, his party would hardly have given it their benediction and its prophets their reward.

Sir Robert is an imperialist—very much more an imperialist than a Canadian—an honest, convinced, intense imperialist. He regards Sir Wilfrid (and me, if he ever gives me a thought) as an imperialistic menace. He considers that control by a Canadian government of the disposition of a Canadian fleet in time of war would be "ill-advised and dangerous" (b). He believes that Canada ought to participate in all British wars, whether the cause be just or unjust (c).

(a) *Hansard*, p. 2280.

(b) *Ante*, p. 4.

(c) *Ante*, p. 4, 5.

When he is in Canada, some minor points in his feelings are held under modification by his environment. But when he goes to England, his pent-up imperialism bursts all bounds. Let me refer to a few instances.

LONDON INFLUENCE.—1. During his recent visit to England, he spoke of himself as a member of the "Imperial War Cabinet;" although there is no such a thing.

2. He arranged for its development, as he said, into "a recognized convention."

3. He spoke of Canadian resources (Canada's nickel, asbestos, etc.) as "the natural resources of the British Empire."

4. He modified his policy as to the exclusion of Indians from British Columbia.

And, as far as we know, he entered no protest against the equally startling actions of his colleague, Sir George Foster, who has committed us (as far as he can) to the following:

5 A scheme of "Empire development and organization."

6. The constitution of an "Imperial Development Board" (twelve members—one of them Canadian) with the duty, "in its initial stages," of "advising and guiding" the various governments. There would be "no inherent difficulty" in the assumption by the Board of "administrative duties"—so it was said.

7. The establishment of the "Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau," with the duty

"of advising from time to time what action, if any, may appear desirable to enable such resources to be developed and made available to meet the total requirements of the Empire."

The Bureau is now in full operation, with Sir George Perley as a member of it.

8. The utilization of Canadian resources in imperial bargaining for trade treaties.

"The possession of assets, such as the Canadian asbestos and nickel supplies, could be used by the British Empire as a powerful means of economic defence."

9. Canadians are not merely to renounce control of their own assets for the benefit of "the Empire as a whole, "but they are "to conserve for the Allied countries, before all others, their natural resources during the whole period of commercial, industrial, agricultural and maritime reconstruction; and for this purpose they undertake to establish special arrangements to facilitate the interchange of these resources"

10. Canada is pledged to all the Allies

"to adopt a common economic policy in the lines laid down in the resolutions which have been passed."

She is

"to facilitate the organization on a permanent basis of their economic alliance" (a).

(a) *Proof of all the above statements may be seen in Kingdom Paper No. 21 at pp. 268, 269, 316, 328, 333, 334, 337, 338, 352, 353, 365. The Paper was recently published by McClelland, Goodchild & Stewart, Toronto.*

LONDON INFLUENCE.—Why we have conscription is now very clear. Had Sir Robert remained in Canada, his imperialism would have continued to be tempered and modified by Canadian atmosphere. In England it ran wild. In Canada he would never have used the language or agreed to any of the schemes above catalogued. In England they appeared to him not only justifiable, but appropriate and necessary. I put it to him: Had he remained in Canada, would he have agreed that Canadian resources should be regarded as "Imperial Resources"? Would he have agreed to the establishment of the "Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau"? Would he have agreed to the utilization of Canadian resources as an imperial bargaining factor? Would he have agreed to the adoption of "a common economic policy with all the Allies"? Most undoubtedly he would not. But he did all those things while he was in England.

And it was while he was in England that he determined to introduce conscription. Had he remained at Ottawa, the fatal speech of June 11 would not have been made. He would have been reminded by his colleagues (if indeed he could have overlooked it) that the United States man-reservoir had overrun the possibilities of transportation. He would have been reminded of the embarrassing shortage of labor in Canada. He would have been reminded that the United Kingdom and the Allies depended very largely upon Canada for production. And in Canadian environment he could not not have failed to appreciate the disrupting consequences of a sudden

imposition upon Quebec of a policy which his political friends had taught Quebec to detest. He would have remembered that a cold douche upon a super-heated substance may cause explosion, and that super-heated men are more explosive than metals. He might, indeed, have inaugurated an attempt to undo all that had been done in Quebec. But that would have been a slow process. And meanwhile he would have most properly declared that—

“HAVING ENLISTED BY VOLUNTARY METHODS OVER 400,000 MEN, I WILL NOT DISRUPT CANADA IN ORDER THAT I MAY SEND BY COMPULSION A FEW THOUSAND MORE.”

Separated from the actualities of Canadian life, Sir Robert allowed himself to be swept away by the sentimental and the spectacular, whereas in Canada he would have retained his touch with the real, the practical, and the valuable. Until early in February of the present year, when he left Ottawa, he saw no necessity for conscription. When in London he saw, if possible, less: for on April 6 the United States entered the war. And yet he determined to enforce conscription in Canada.

Very obviously, the only reason for his change of attitude was that he had ceased to think along Canadian lines. He had assumed towards Canada, for the moment, the attitude of a Joseph Chamberlain or a Winston Churchill. And if any one thinks that that explanation of the genesis of conscription in Canada is improbable, I agree, but I ask him two questions:

1. What other explanation is possible?

2. Is there any better explanation of all the other extraordinary things that Sir Robert did in London?

WHAT SIR ROBERT OUGHT AND OUGHT NOT TO HAVE DONE.

What Sir Robert ought, and ought not, to have done is very clear:

1. He ought to have dissociated himself and his party from the Nationalist propaganda in 1910. But he did not.

2. When Sir George Foster, Mr. Barker, and others were sending assistance to the Nationalist candidate in Drummond-Arthabaska,

Sir Robert ought to have telegraphed his repudiation of Nationalist doctrine. . But he did not.

3. He ought to have made clear and certain his disapprobation of the close co-operation of his party managers in Quebec with the Nationalists in the general election of 1911. But he did not.

4. He ought to have protested against the invitation of the Sudbury Conservative Association to Mr. Bourassa to extend his propaganda into Ontario. But he did not.

5. He ought to have protested (if he knew of it) against financial assistance being given by his party to Mr. Bourassa's newspaper. But he did not.

6. He ought not to have given seats in his cabinet—the only three French-Canadian seats that he had—to men who had taken a leading part in the Nationalist propaganda. But he did.

7. He ought at least to have required from any such men, frank renunciation of the doctrine which they had been preaching, before he elevated them to places in the Government of Canada. But he did not.

8. He ought not to have selected the Nationalist who asked, "Who is His Majesty? Have we any Majesty here?" for the conspicuously honorable position of seconder of the motion for reply to the Governor's speech. But he did.

9. He ought not to have introduced the conscription bill. But he did.

10. If conscription had been necessary, he ought to have preceded its introduction by a campaign of education. More especially, he ought to have endeavored to counteract what he and his friends had done in Quebec in 1910-1911. But he did not.

11. While recruiting was ceasing, Sir Robert, in the summer of 1916, at a number of meetings, urged the duty of "national service." He ought to have urged conscription if he intended its introduction. But he did not.

12. While recruiting was proceeding, he ought to have declined to deplete the farms? But he did not.

13. He ought to have given heed to the Senate's declaration of the necessity, during the present year, for

"the breaking of a large increase of wild lands in order that such new soil may be ready for cultivation next year and our productive capital thereby increased" (a).

(a) *Ante*, p. 17.

But he did not.

14. He ought to have given effect to the Senate's declaration that

"The shortage of farm labour must be met, and the method of meeting it must be prompt and decisive, if our present production of wheat and other cereals is to be maintained, let alone increased" (a).

But he did not.

15. In framing his policy, he ought to have taken into most anxious consideration the nationally disrupting effect of the introduction of conscription. But he did not. In his speech of June 11 he denied that his bill would "induce disunion, discord and strife," or that its consequences should "be dreaded."

He sees more clearly now. Into his union government, he has not succeeded in inducing a single Quebec Liberal to enter; and Mr. Seigny has told us that if he were to resign, his race would be unrepresented in the government(b). Neither Sir John A. Macdonald nor Sir Wilfrid Laurier would have reduced Canada to such disastrous cleavage.


"HOW WOULD THE KAISER VOTE?"

The question "**How would the Kaiser vote?**" is an impertinent one; but as it appears in huge letters on many billboards in Ottawa, it ought to be answered. My reply is that I am not in the Kaiser's confidence, and that he does so many curious things, that I am doubtful of his perfect sanity; but giving him credit for a modicum of sense, I am inclined to think the **THE KAISER WOULD VOTE FOR THE MAN WHO IS DISRUPTING CANADA**, even although in many other respects that man is most patiently and loyally doing very excellent work. The Kaiser has good reason to dislike us, and to wish to see us split into factions. He must enjoy seeing it done.

JOHN S. EWART.
OTTAWA, ONT.

(a) *Ante*, p. 17.

(b) *Mr. Blondin is in France.*



The Mortimer Company Limited, Ottawa, Printers.



